The Silent Epidemic of Child Recruitment in Urban Colombia

The issue of child recruitment has always been a concern for Colombians, but grew even more following the assassination of the senator and presidential hopeful, Miguel Uribe Turbay, on 7 June 2025.

Not only did the killing highlight rising political violence in the country, it also drew attention to the growing phenomenon of child recruitment: the assassin who shot Uribe was a 15-year-old boy.

This was a "clear instrumentalization of a child that had been convinced to commit a crime, knowing that the child would be unable to support an investigation against the ultimate intellectual authors", Elizabeth Dickinson, deputy director for Latin America at the International Crisis Group (ICG), told Latin Times.

Indeed, child recruitment in Colombia is on the rise, having quadrupled in the last five years, according to a UNICEF report released 6 February 2026.

While the problem is especially grave in rural areas, where children are drafted into standing armies, Uribe's killing highlighted how armed groups also subcontract criminal groups which exploit children living in cities to do their dirty work.

An issue invisibilized: the absence of legal protection for urban children

Dickinson revealed that children living in rural areas, who are recruited in the "traditional sense into rank and file groups," are conscripted to be used as uniform-wearing cannon fodder with two potential outcomes: escape or death.

In contrast, urban child recruits remain undetected. They attend school and live with their families while fulfilling the orders delivered to them via criminal group networks.

Hilda Beatriz Molano Casas, coordinator of the Coalition against the involvement of Children and Young People in the Armed Conflict in Colombia (COALICO) highlighted that these urban children, who are "used" or "exploited" by groups, are not protected by International Humanitarian Law (IHL), unlike those who are "recruited" or "conscripted" in rural areas. This is due to the fact that IHL rules only apply when there is a recognized armed conflict.

IHL can apply when there is an international or non-international armed conflict. Therefore, in purely urban gang or criminal contexts, it is harder to meet the threshold, meaning IHL rarely applies.

Molano revealed that after the 2016 peace agreement with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the government has often been reluctant to classify newer criminal groups, such as drug-trafficking organizations or urban gangs, as formal parties to an armed conflict, despite the fact that these urban groups are often subcontracted by larger armed groups to exploit urban children.

This policy decision has been adhered to for the prevention of potential retaliatory attacks and cycles of violence which could be inflicted by organized crime and armed groups, and for the preservation of President Gustavo Petro's Total Peace narrative, Molano added.

Meanwhile, vulnerable children who are "used" serve sentences for committing offenses such as theft, homicide, or extortion, without proper recognition of the role of organized criminal groups or urban gangs in recruiting them.

These subcontractor networks operating in Cali, Buenaventura, Medellín and Bogotá act with a great deal of impunity and anonymity, according to Molano. By implicating a child who is "paid by someone who has been paid by someone else" the ultimate author's identity is concealed, Dickinson pointed out.

Molano noted that as these groups go unnoticed, they continue to proliferate and diversify under the authorities' noses.

The obstacles of verifying data

Collecting data for those children used or instrumentalized is harder to gather given that these networks, though working directly for organized crime and armed groups, operate out of sight.

Tracking children recruited into standing armies, on the other hand, has been better achieved. Information transfers on child recruitment have been secured as a non-negotiable of peace talks between the Colombian government and armed groups.

The Estado Mayor Central (EMC) provided detailed censuses of the children entering their ranks, revealing that as many as 37% of all fighters were children while the Gaitanist Army of Colombia (EGC), also known as the Clan del Golfo, has committed to providing similar information.

The EMC's census was a significant milestone, which has not been replicated for children in urban areas who are instrumentalized by groups; an issue which is practically imperceptible, according to Molano.

When sharing COALICO's data on the subject to date, Molano pointed out that the identified cases of exploitation or "use" rather than recruitment in the "traditional sense" do not reflect the reality of the situation, and could represent as little as 10% of actual data.

She emphasised that the rise of the "urban phenomenon" of child recruitment would prove more difficult to monitor.

Recruitment trends

Unlike the examples of recruitment in rural areas, highlighted by ICG, which demonstrate tactics where recruiters hang around schools, flashing their cars, motorcycles, cell phones, and even alcohol and flaunting 'the good life', Molano singled out the role of social media as a significant factor in recruiting children in urban zones.

Out of sight and left to their own devices, young children are easily groomed by offers of employment and the "perks" of life inside criminal groups, according to Molano. The jurisdiction of social media knows no bounds, meaning that the tentacles of these groups reach children inside their homes, schools and towns via TikTok.

Recruiters also tend to target children who are particularly vulnerable due to various socio-economic and environmental factors, in an approach Molano described as "systematic."

The ICG corroborated this, revealing evidence that senior recruitment commanders employ a network of managers and low-level recruiters, with specific quotas and parameters to fulfil, and that they are encouraged to find the most efficient means of finding young boys, girls and adolescents to recruit.

An especially disturbing trend is the systematic targeting of ever-younger girls by armed groups, according to Molano. She revealed that girls as young as 11 are being kidnapped or coerced by armed groups for sexual exploitation and trafficking in rural and urban zones alike.

This observation marks a sharp decrease in age from data gathered from years before, when the majority of girls targeted were aged 14 to 15, according to Molano.

Devastation in the wake of armed groups

Miguel Uribe Turbay's death serves as a reminder not only of the political violence committed by these groups but of the tragedy faced by a growing number of Colombian children who are recruited and systematically targeted to carry out their dirty work.

While many organized crime groups continue to operate with relative impunity, child recruits, secretly groomed by their extensive networks, are the ones who suffer the gravest consequences.

In the meantime, COALICO continues conducting studies with the Colombian Family Welfare Institute (ICBF) across 41 municipalities, in the hope of securing the rights of these forgotten children.

Molano expressed her hope that the armed groups participating in peace talks could set a precedent for criminal groups. She emphasized that this would allow authorities to understand the extent of the issue across rural and urban zones in order to better tackle it.

She seemed resolute in her belief that the legal blind spot leaving instrumentalized urban children vulnerable could be addressed soon, concluding "when dialogue is established...there is a better chance of achieving humanitarian deals and strengthening support programs, especially for girls, boys, and adolescents who are victims of exploitation and 'use.'"